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FOREWORD
Colombia is a paradigm of the failing state that has enormous
implications for American foreign policy and the adaptation of
U.S. air and landpower to the hemispheric threat environment.
The instability, corruption, displacement of people, and violence
generated by Colombia’s unholy trinity of narcotics traffickers,
insurgents, and paramilitaries are spilling over into virtually all
of northern South America and Panama. Thus, the stability and
political sovereignty of the region are being compromised. And, at
the same time, progress toward achieving the Free Trade Area of
the Americas (FTAA) and the economic integration of the
Western Hemisphere by 2005 are being severely threatened.
Clearly, vital interests are at stake.
In this timely monograph, a colleague at the Air War College,
Dr. Judith Gentleman, outlines some of the detail and
implications of the regional security crisis in the Andes and
makes recommendations for U.S. civil-military involvement in
the hemispheric security arena. She argues for the United States
to lead in the articulation of strategic objectives, while designing
a defensible and feasible policy that critical elements in North
America, Central and South America, Europe, and Japan can
understand and support. She specifically argues for the U.S.
military to build stronger and more cooperative security
relationships within the circle of affected states around
Colombia.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to join with the
North-South Center in offering this monograph as a contribution
to the international security debate on the situation in Colombia.
It is critically important to the vital interests of the United States,
Colombia, the hemisphere, and the global community.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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PREFACE

This monograph is an invaluable contribution to the
ongoing study of Plan Colombia begun in February 2001 by
the U.S. Army War College and the Dante B. Fascell
North-South Center of the University of Miami. In her
presentation, Dr. Judith A. Gentleman of the U.S. Air War
College demonstrates the widening impact of the “spillover
effect” into each of Colombia’s neighbors and into Brazil and
Panama. She then proposes sensible ideas worthy of
policymakers’ consideration.
For some time it has been apparent that the crisis of
Colombia is no longer confined to that country. In fact,
under no imaginable scenario can Colombia’s problems be
contained within it. The activities of drug traffickers and
guerrillas are on the rise in the entire region, coming from
Colombia.
Given such compelling evidence of spillover, why has a
regional, cooperative response been so slow in taking shape?
Dr. Gentleman goes right to the heart of the matter: a
pattern of competing objectives and inherent tensions. To
begin, Plan Colombia was seen in the region as a
U.S.-inspired initiative by Colombia, about which the
neighboring countries were not consulted in advance. Its
objectives, while broad, were supported only in their
military component (and by the United States alone).
Moreover, the United States and Colombia were not really
in harmony as to the true objective, which, for the United
States was suppression of the drug trade; and for Colombia,
pacification of the guerrilla insurgency.
The Andean countries have also come around slowly and
grudgingly to the concept, as the author points out, that only
extensive international cooperation will work in an age of
globalization. To do so, however, requires at least partial
renunciation of the cherished principles of “nonintervenv

tion, national self-determination, and sovereignty.”
Meeting in Cartagena in April 2001 before the Quebec City
Summit of the Americas, Andean leaders agreed on a
regional counternarcotics strategy. They also called on the
United States to renew the Andean Trade Preference Act
and to include Venezuela in it. Such agreement is a great
step forward.
Much depends on the support of the United States for
such a comprehensive regional approach. The Bush
administration has responded positively with its new
Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) of over $800 million,
announced in May 2001. It will expand assistance into
seven countries in the areas of alternative economic
development, infrastructure development, human rights
activities, and initiatives other than fighting narcotics
trafficking. The new U.S. approach may well draw the
promised (but not delivered) European assistance to the
developmental aspects of Plan Colombia.
Dr. Gentleman recommends, however, that the new U.S.
regional approach avoid simply responding to “political
constraints rather than strategic analysis,” by which she
means “the political predilections” of Colombia’s neighbors.
She makes the case that a better level of analysis be applied
to design a “defensible and feasible” policy and that a
“special envoy” be appointed for the Andean region to
oversee and coordinate the program.

AMBLER H. MOSS, JR.
Director
The Dante B. Fascell North-South
Center
University of Miami
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THE REGIONAL SECURITY CRISIS
IN THE ANDES:
PATTERNS OF STATE RESPONSE

THE ANDEAN CRISIS AND GLOBALIZATION
The growing security crisis in the nations of the Andean
Ridge has focused attention upon the seemingly intractable
problem of consolidating democratic governments in the
context of increasing political, economic, and military
difficulties. Throughout the region, the governments of
Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, along
with neighboring states Panama and Brazil, find
themselves confronted by a series of security challenges
that reflect the influence of globalization upon traditional
dimensions of conflict in the region. Globalization has not
only redefined security issues in a generic sense,1 but now
complicates and dramatically increases the difficulty states
face in shaping responses by traditional national means.
Analysts have suggested that effective state sovereignty
is being whittled away under pressure from the forces of
regionalization and globalization. While there is little
agreement on the precise definition of globalization, several
elements have gained broad currency. Of particular note is
the growing phenomenon of “the inability of nation-states to
cope with global problems that require global solutions,
such as demography, ecology, human rights, and nuclear
proliferation.”2 The nations of the Andean Ridge appear to
be increasingly overwhelmed by external forces that
converged with domestic problems to create nearly
insurmountable obstacles to crisis management and
development.
Specifically, the weak states of the Andean area are now
confronted by networks of drug and arms trafficking, by
pressure from rising domestic discontent and insurgency,
and increasingly by international criminal networks tied to
1

these illegal financial resources. They also face demands by
other international actors that national leaders confront
these challenges to national authority. Simultaneously,
these states face demands from international organizations
and external states to conform to norms of political and
economic liberalization deemed to be foundational for
contemporary market democracy. Throughout the Andean
Ridge, levels of democratic practice that had been achieved
earlier have now eroded in the face of these challenges.
From Peru to Venezuela, their are increasing indications
that the regional states lack the capacity to surmount these
difficulties by traditional means.
Historically, states in the region have placed highest
priority upon the values of sovereignty, nonintervention,
and national self-determination, thereby resisting
multilateral or collective approaches to problems affecting
the region. The record of successful collaboration for
regional problem-solving has been spotty at best. While
states have been eager to utilize international
organizations and forums and international law as means
to achieving national ends, much less common has been a
willingness to work collectively on a sustained basis at the
regional level. The acute nature of the deepening crises in
the region may be promoting a new direction in regional
relations, however, with far greater emphasis upon
collective determination than has been seen before. This
monograph will examine the sources of the security crisis in
the region, discuss national responses to the challenges
faced by these states, and assess the likelihood that regional
states may begin to successfully overcome the constraints of
traditional political culture while mapping out strategies
for collectively confronting the region’s security challenges.
THE COLOMBIAN CRISIS
The current axis of the Andean crisis is to be found in
Colombia, where a historically weak state has been all but
overwhelmed by an insurgency now harnessed to
narcotrafficking, in turn propelling the development of
2

powerful paramilitary forces and assorted criminal
elements, many with ties to international networks. At the
same time that these forces continue to become more
powerful, the Colombian state’s capacity to respond has
been weakened further due to corruption, an impotent
justice system, a weak military, woefully outgunned law
enforcement capability, and the inability of the political
class to make progress toward a negotiated peace
settlement. So riven with conflicts at this point in its
history, the Colombian state, as some argue, may have
ceased to exist as measured by any conventional
understanding of sovereignty, certainly when defined in
terms of territorial control.
Colombia’s deepening crisis pushed the United States
into far greater involvement in the region for three reasons.
First, Colombia had become the premier cocaine source for
the United States. Second, the United States identified
Colombia as one of a group of key states whose democracies
were in jeopardy and upon which special efforts needed to be
focused. This group also included Indonesia, Ukraine, and
Nigeria.3 Third, the United States regards Colombia as the
greatest threat to regional stability now facing the South
American region. At the Fourth Defense Ministerial of the
Americas, convened at Manaus, Brazil, in October 2000,
then U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen likened
Colombia’s political pathology to a disease, observing that
“it will spread like a cancer to other regions.”4 He argued
that democracy in Latin America was, simply put, at risk
because of Colombia’s crisis.5 As the Colombia Task Force
report of the Council on Foreign Relations and the
Inter-American Dialogue reported,
Colombia’s deterioration spreads instability and conflict
beyond its borders. Insurgent and paramilitary groups have
made frequent incursions into the neighboring countries of
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama. Such incursions could well
increase. The wider region is increasingly uncertain,
reflecting both real spillover effects and independent,
troublesome political developments. A stronger Colombia
means a stronger region and a stronger Western Hemisphere.6
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In still another perspective, former Assistant Secretary
of State Bernard Aronson argued that U.S. interest in
Colombia’s security crisis was shaped by three issues:
drugs, migration, and oil.7 Although the Colombia crisis
long remained a second tier matter for the United States
when compared to security issues involving Asia or the
Middle East, for example, the increasing destabilization
there came to be viewed in the late 1990s as a priority
matter. The former U.S. “Drug Czar,” General (Retired)
Barry McCaffrey, urged that more attention be focused
upon the growing regional crisis, but recognized that the
U.S. domestic political environment would more easily
support such efforts if the emphasis were placed upon drugs
and military and law enforcement assistance. At the same
time, the Pastrana government was urged to develop a
comprehensive approach to the crisis and, with substantial
U.S. involvement, unveiled the ambitious Plan Colombia in
2000.
The Clinton administration enthusiastically endorsed
Plan Colombia as the coherent, feasible approach that was
needed. Problems soon emerged, however. The United
States was widely seen to have all but developed the plan
itself. Neither Colombia nor the United States had
consulted neighboring states, nor even kept them informed.
Ecuador’s Foreign Minister Heinz Moeller complained, for
example, that “this was a ball to which we were not invited.
Ecuador was not consulted at all.”8 The failure to consult
only made matters worse when U.S. officials also readily
acknowledged that the plan would put pressure on
bordering states, increasing the security problems for those
nations. Nonetheless, the United States pushed for the
plan’s acceptance and campaigned to build support for the
plan throughout the region.
In the meantime, dramatic upheaval unfolded
throughout the Andes. Of all the states affected by
narcotrafficking and by the Colombia crisis, Ecuador was
perhaps the most severely affected because of its limited
ability to respond. Having thus far successfully avoided
4

being pulled into the Colombian conflict, Ecuador now saw
itself threatened by major incursions of refugees that were
likely to flee Colombia once the counternarcotics offensive
into southern Colombia commenced in the period 2001-2002
under the terms of Plan Colombia. Foreign Minister
Moeller worried about “the cancerous tumor being removed
from Colombia and metastasizing in Ecuador.”9 Wishing
not to be drawn into the conflict, Ecuador acknowledged
that the Colombian insurgents and paramilitaries had for
many years freely used Ecuadorian territory for rest and
recuperation as well as for resupply. In addition,
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) elements
were known to have established settlements for family
members, and, indeed, intermarriage had become
commonplace between FARC elements and Ecuadorian
nationals on the northern Ecuadorian border.
Northern Ecuador had also become an important supply
point for growing narcotrafficking and guerrilla interests in
southern Colombia. Given its weak military capabilities,
and not wishing to directly confront Colombian irregular
military forces, Ecuador’s approach had been to rely upon
the FARC’s stated commitment to avoid using Ecuadorian
national territory for armed activity. In a bargain with
compelling outside force, Ecuador sought to keep Colombian
incursions confined to noncombatant purposes. No such
agreement had been reached, however, either with the
Colombian paramilitaries who had been growing in
strength, or with narcotraffickers. In effect, Ecuador,
already beset by its own overwhelming political and
economic difficulties, including a recent attempted coup,
found itself politically and militarily threatened by the
Colombia crisis. Evidence suggested that the implicit
bargain with Colombia’s narcotrafficking interests had run
seriously aground. U.S. Southern Command’s
(USSOUTHCOM) Commander-in-Chief General Peter
Pace testified before the U.S. Senate in 2001 that nurseries
of coca and heroin poppy seedlings had been found in remote
areas of Ecuador, and that guerrillas working with drug
5

traffickers had been spotted moving across Colombia’s
borders into both Ecuador and Panama.10
Despite progress by the Fujimori government in quelling
insurgency and drug trafficking throughout the 1990s, Peru
had emerged from the summer 2000 national elections in
complete disarray, the subject of an Organization of
American States (OAS) diplomatic sanction and diplomatic
intervention. These were then followed by the dramatic
implosion of the Fujimori government itself. Further, new
assessments suggested that coca cultivation had once again
begun to increase, with indications that the acreage under
coca cultivation had in fact grown over the previous 2 years.
Arguably, it was the political firestorm ignited by the
alleged involvement of President Fujimori’s principal
political associate and director of national intelligence,
Vladimiro Montesinos, in arms trafficking and arms sales to
Colombian guerrillas, all with the apparent complicity of
the Peruvian military, that brought an end to the Fujimori
regime.11 While certainly Fujimori’s record of electoral
manipulations also contributed to public demands for
political change, it was not until Fujimori found himself
mired in the Colombian problem over arms trafficking with
the FARC did the regime collapse, opening the door to
wide-ranging investigations of the military’s and other
government officials’complicity in drug trafficking.12
Elsewhere in the Andes, Bolivia experienced a
resurgence of chronic instability, once thought to have been
largely allayed due to success in the counterdrug war and
due to the Banzer government reforms. While not directly
tied to the Colombian crisis, its difficulties stemmed in large
part from controversy over the government’s counterdrug
policy. Following decades of turmoil, under the leadership of
former General Banzer, now Bolivia’s elected president, the
nation seemed to be on the brink of resolving the issue of
illegal drug production, having succeeded in implementing
all but the final elements of its “Dignity Plan.” Indeed, along
with Peru, Bolivia had been touted internationally as a
success story, one demonstrating that it was possible to
6

defeat the scourge of illegal drug production through an
aggressive policy of crop eradication and alternative
development.
With the onset of 2001, however, it became clear that
neither eradication nor alternative development had won
the day.13 Indeed, the plan to build several small garrisons
to hold the line on the dismantled fields incited the
coca-producing peasantry to violence against the
government. Despite all the public declarations of success,
the cocaleros apparently had every intention of returning to
coca production once the crop eradication sweeps had
terminated and counterdrug forces had returned to the
barracks. Clearly, the lucrative nature of drug production
continued to appeal to Bolivia’s impoverished peasantry
who were unwilling to follow through with the wholesale
relocation of population from drug-producing regions to
zones suitable for “alternative development.”14
At the same time, for Venezuela, Colombia’s crisis
increasingly put pressure on the Chavez government and
led to strained relations with the United States. Venezuela
viewed itself as the victim of Colombia’s crisis, suffering
frequent incursions by refugees, guerrillas, paramilitaries,
and narcotraffickers, and it thus voiced concerns over the
prospects for a further widening of the conflict. Venezuela
had already become home to hundreds of thousands of
Colombian economic migrants in the 1980s and 1990s, and
the prospect of further conflict in Colombian territory
adjacent to the Venezuelan border promised to escalate the
numbers of Colombian nationals seeking refuge outside for
reasons of personal safety.
On Colombia’s northern border, Panama sounded
alarms over the extensive, repeated territorial incursions of
insurgent and paramilitary elements from Colombia. Never
territory well controlled by central authority, and without a
military of its own to, at least in theory, defend the territory
from illicit use, the Darien province of Panama became an
area of essentially free reign for Colombian insurgent and
7

paramilitary forces. Increasingly, Panamanians expressed
concern that the Moscoso government’s prospects for
dealing both with of the internal pressures (stemming
largely from corruption, some owing to narcotrafficking and
money laundering) and with the external pressures
(involving narcotrafficking, insurgency, and
paramilitaries) were slim at best. A tendency to ignore the
problem was made more difficult to sustain with the
promise delivered by United Self Defense Forces of
Colombia (AUC) paramilitary commanders that they would
consider Panama fair game if Colombian insurgents were
able to use Panamanian territory with impunity.
Of all the countries considered, Brazil arguably faced
some of the more daunting challenges deriving from the
Colombian crisis, chiefly owing to its vast unguarded
Amazonian territories. To begin with, counterdrug efforts in
the Andes increasingly had pushed narcotrafficking
operations into Brazil as a result of the widely noted
“balloon effect.” With Brazilian national territory (land, air,
and riverine) increasingly impacted by this traffic, Brazil
felt increased pressure upon its already weak ability to
protect national resources and the sovereignty of national
territory. Essentially, Brazil could control neither its
airspace, ground, or riverine traffic. With only relatively few
federal police to monitor the entire country for counterdrug
operations, Brazil faced heavy odds in contending with the
threat to its territory.
While Brazil’s Amazon region had never been well
controlled, Brazil’s national security officials increasingly
recognized that the future pattern of development in the
region could be seriously affected by the myriad illegal
unmonitored activities taking place. Mining activity,
forestry, and indigenous communities were all affected by
the uncontrolled situation in the region. The arrest of
Brazil’s leading drug lord, Luis Fernando Da Costa
(Fernandinho Beira-Mar), by Colombian forces on
Colombian territory in the spring of 2001 brought into bold
relief the growing ties between narcotics trafficking and the
8

Colombian insurgency. “Fernandinho” had allegedly served
both as a major trader in cocaine from the FARC and as a
supplier of arms to the FARC, all via Brazilian territory,
reportedly relying upon Paraguayan, Russian, and
Surinamese organized crime elements in the process.15
STATE RESPONSES TO THE ANDEAN CRISIS
Colombia.
With the success of counterdrug operations in Peru and
Bolivia in the first half of the 1990s, and with the successful
interdiction of the Andean air bridge, more and more
elements of cocaine production moved to Colombia from
former, more dispersed producing areas. With the defeat of
the centralized cartels in Colombia in the 1980s and 1990s,
the industry moved in several new directions, the most
important of which came to be the strengthening of ties
between producers and both the FARC and the AUC, the
so-called paramilitaries. Initially, the FARC swelled its
coffers with “tax payments” from coca producers, as did the
AUC at a later point. Over time, however, the FARC
reportedly became more directly involved in various stages
of coca production, increasing coca production by a third in
the demilitarized zone, the despeje, over which it had
exclusive control.16 Ceded temporarily to the FARC by the
Pastrana government as a confidence-building measure
designed to get the peace negotiations off the ground, this
area the size of Switzerland also came to be used as a
platform for hiding kidnap victims and for increased
military preparations.
The Colombian crisis had now all but spiraled out of
control. Law enforcement was incapable of dealing with
either escalating traditional crime or the escalating crime
associated directly or indirectly with drugs. The justice
system was equally incapable of contributing to a solution,
as it had been both corrupted and intimidated. The first
priority, that of regaining control over the national
9

territory, was now arguably beyond the reach of either the
Colombian military or the police without substantial
improvements in capabilities. Nearly two million persons
had been displaced by the violence and either were internal
refugees flooding into Colombia’s cities, or had left
Colombia for neighboring countries.17 The nation’s elites
had left en masse, with immigration rates into the United
States skyrocketing and with a special protected status
designation for such Colombians under consideration by the
U.S. Congress. The economy had gone into a tailspin, with
the country experiencing its first serious recession in
modern history. Nearly half of the nation’s territory was
effectively beyond state control. The most compelling armed
forces in the Colombian state were the nearly 20,000 armed
elements of the insurgent armies (along with their 36,000
civilian militia supporters) and the over 8,000 (and growing)
AUC paramilitary forces.
At the behest of the United States, as we noted earlier,
the Colombian government developed Plan Colombia as an
approach to resolving some of these issues. The multi-year,
multi-billion dollar plan existed at two levels: the
conceptual level and the practical level. At the conceptual
level, the plan appeared to be a comprehensive approach to
issues of social development, human rights, law
enforcement, economic development, and peacemaking. At
the practical level, however, the only part that was likely to
be funded was the U.S.-sponsored element that targeted
counterdrug efforts. The U.S. contribution of $1.3 billion (of
the total proposed $7.5 billion) focused upon the
development of a military capability designed to support
law enforcement counterdrug efforts. Pledges of non-U.S.
international financial support were disappointing. While
the European Union pledged several hundred million
dollars, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)
offered support to social development projects, the bulk of
the financing had to be shouldered by Colombia itself,
chiefly through loans.18
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The approach espoused by the Colombian government
for confronting its internal crisis was based on a two-track
process: (1) peace negotiations with insurgents where and
when possible, and (2) armed confrontation with the
narcotraffickers, principally with U.S. support. Put simply,
the primary preferred goal of the Colombian government
was to reach peace with the insurgency, while the primary
goal of U.S. policymakers was to curtail the production and
export of Colombian cocaine to the United States. In other
words, in principle (though not in practice) the Colombian
government’s objectives and the U.S. Government’s
objectives were very different. Reflecting this distinction,
the United States provided assistance to support
Colombia’s development of three specially trained
anti-narcotics battalions, and provided several hundred
U.S. military personnel along with several hundred civilian
contractors to support counterdrug training activities.
At the same time, despite substantial efforts to
modernize the organization of Colombia’s armed forces,
those combatant forces remained very limited in their
capability to confront their principal foe, the insurgents.
Despite these limitations, as a result of its partnership with
the Untied States, the government concentrated scarce
resources on those forces it believed to be of secondary
concern, narcotraffickers. While the profits earned by the
FARC from narcotrafficking connections certainly played a
pivotal role in their ability to sustain operations, Colombian
analysis suggested that drug trafficking could not be shut
down if the insurgency were not first defeated. In other
words, the government apparently saw no other source of
support available to meet its urgent requirements. In its
weakened state, it accepted the U.S. initiative as the only
game in town.
As noted previously, at the outset both the Colombian
and the U.S. Governments acknowledged that the plan was
likely to produce spillover effects, broadening the conflict as
narcotraffickers, insurgents, and paramilitary forces
increased their use of neighboring states’ territories,
11

thereby regionalizing the conflict. While regional leaders
were willing to support President Pastrana’s efforts to reach
a negotiated peace settlement, they voiced serious objection
to Plan Colombia due to the spillover potential resulting
from the military rather than socio-economic emphasis that
was felt to characterize the plan. While defenders noted that
nearly 80 percent of the proposed funding was for
nonmilitary expenditures, detractors noted that the only
firm commitment was, in fact, the U.S. commitment to
military and law enforcement expenditure.
Despite anxious U.S. and Colombian appeals for support
at the meeting of the presidents of South America’s 12
countries, convened by Brazil in Brasilia in September
2000, such appeals met with only measured success.
Chilean President Lagos reported that the presidents fully
support “the peace process, which implies negotiations” as
“distinct from the problem of narcotics trafficking.”
Colombian Foreign Minister Guillermo Fernandez de Soto
complained about this response, arguing that “it is unjust
and counterintuitive that Colombia’s efforts to strengthen
itself to fight the threat it faces are the subject of complaints
when no one criticizes the arms buildup of the insurgents.
We want cooperation, not unfair criticism.”19
A vocal opponent of the plan was Venezuelan President
Hugo Chavez, who declared, “We support Plan Colombia so
long as it does not generate combat activities that could
complicate our situation,” noting further that he feared the
threat of “the Vietnamization of the entire Amazon
region.”20 Chavez also argued that “[the plan] is going to
make the conflict even more tense and is going to worsen
armed clashes.” He further observed, “Peace cannot be
achieved by arms, that is a great contradiction.”21 Earlier
assurances offered by both Presidents Pastrana and Clinton
apparently did little to allay the fears of regional leaders
that the spillover effects of Plan Colombia could be
adequately handled. During his visit to Colombia in August
2000, President Clinton admitted that the plan would likely
“cause the problem to spill over the borders” of neighboring
12

countries, but added that the United States would provide
“a substantial amount of money to help other countries deal
with those problems at the border when they start.”22 Such
assurances were in no way sufficient to bridge the gap
between the U.S. plan and South American objections.
Venezuela’s Response.
Under President Chavez’s leadership, Venezuela sought
to chart an independent course with respect to the
Colombian crisis and the problem of narcotrafficking. These
efforts reflected the continuing and longstanding
difficulties in Venezuelan-Colombian relations, along with
the increasingly tense relations between Venezuela and the
United States. From the outset, Chavez’s populist message
had struck a discordant note with Colombian authorities, as
the Venezuelan leader never missed an opportunity to
criticize the Colombian “oligarchy,” pointing to unfavorable
contrasts between Colombia’s internal social policies and
his own “Bolivarian Revolution.” To the consternation of
Bogota, Chavez sponsored talks in Caracas between
representatives of the FARC and the Colombian
government itself. Although Bogota viewed Chavez as
engaging in unwanted meddling, it did send the nation’s
Attorney General to participate in the talks. Yet relations
were rubbed raw by the experience. Venezuela’s Defense
Minister Rangel went so far as to state publicly that
Venezuela has the right to talk “with those who have
power.” Further commenting upon the Colombians’
annoyance over the matter, he suggested that the
Colombians “would get over it.”23 A FARC delegation,
including Olga Marin, daughter of FARC chief Manuel
Marulanda, had been hosted at a meeting of the Latin
American Parliament in the Venezuelan National
Assembly in November 2000.24 Caracas was generally
thought to have good contacts with the FARC, if for no other
reason than to be in a position to hold the insurgency at bay
and to maintain some leverage over their forces. They would
thus not pose uncontainable problems to the Venezuelan
13

government, or so it was hoped. At the same time, such
outreach to Colombia’s insurgents was designed to serve as
testimony to Chavez’s domestic constituency as to their
leader’s progressive credentials.
Such irritations notwithstanding, Venezuela had
suffered incursions from Colombians over its border for
many years. As one news broadcast described the situation,
“Venezuela is constantly suffering the negative effects of
Colombian drug trafficking: the air, river, and land routes
are disrupted and those who are not part of the problem still
have to suffer the consequences of this same problem, one
that is unpredictably grave.” Colombian insurgents had
kidnapped scores of Venezuelan ranchers and business
leaders, and the 1,400-mile border offered porous transit
points for illicit trafficking of narcotics, weapons, and
people. Recently Colombian kidnapping gangs were formed
to seize Venezuelan ranchers to “sell” them to Colombian
guerrillas.25 At the same time, Colombian authorities
charged that Colombia’s insurgents routinely obtained
weapons from the Venezuelan armed forces.26
Venezuela’s release in 2001 of National Liberation Army
(ELN) insurgent Jose Maria Ballestas, hijacker of a
Colombian commercial flight in 1999, only served to further
sour relations. 27 Finally, Venezuela complained that
Colombian traffickers used Venezuelan territory as a major
route for shipping drugs destined for the European
market.28 Nonetheless, Venezuela remained steadfast
under Chavez in refusing to allow U.S. counterdrug
operations on Venezuelan national territory and continued
to refuse to reauthorize counterdrug surveillance flights by
the United States in Venezuelan airspace that had been
stopped by the Chavez government. In that regard,
Venezuelan authorities also suggested that the new U.S.
Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) in Aruba and Curacao
represented nothing more than a staging platform for the
invasion of South America by the United States. More
recently, however, Defense Minister Rangel reportedly

14

agreed to visit with USSOUTHCOM and American
operations at Key West.
Venezuela suffered increasing influxes of refugees as
Colombian paramilitaries cleared towns on the Colombian
side of the border of suspected insurgent sympathizers.
These influxes were in addition to the tens of thousands of
Colombians who had previously, from the Venezuelan point
of view, “colonized western Venezuela.”29
Both President Chavez and Venezuela’s former defense
minister warned that Colombia’s efforts must not worsen
Venezuela’s difficulties, suggesting that Colombia’s conflict
could spread and provoke a “medium intensity” regional
conflict.30 Then Defense Minister Ismael Hurtado Soucre
noted, “We’re worried about the military plan. The way that
it’s done could generate more violence.”31
Chavez commented at length about Plan Colombia:
We are terribly affected by the war in Colombia. Peasants
have been kidnapped or murdered; there is terror on the
border. It is a lawless land. We want peace. But peace cannot
be achieved with 80 Blackhawks or military trainers, but by
dialogue. So it is a terrible mistake that the governments of
the United States and Colombia are making. We are warning
that the conflict could escalate and become another Vietnam.32

Indeed, such fears seemed to be well borne out as
Colombia accused Venezuela of an illegal military incursion
(not the first) in October 2000. Colombia’s Defense Minister
Luis Ramirez charged that Venezuelan forces invaded
Colombian national territory with 30 helicopter-borne
troops, and that Venezuelan military aircraft had fired
rockets and destroyed houses and livestock. Venezuela’s
then Foreign Minister Jose Rangel denied this and called
Colombia’s claim “irresponsible” and a “vulgar lie.”33
In the meantime, Venezuela deployed thousands of
reinforcements to its Colombian border to deal with rising
levels of conflict, stationing 10,000 soldiers in what were
described as “two theaters of operation.”34 In an early sign of
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what would later come to be a willingness to cooperate on a
regional basis, however, Chavez also floated a trial balloon
proposing that South American states form a NATO-like
military alliance to deal with regional problems, a measure
that was vetoed by Brazil’s Foreign Minister Luiz Felipe
Lampreia as antithetical to Brazil’s own interests.35
President Chavez sought to distance himself from U.S.
influence in the region in a number of different ways,
particularly with respect to U.S.-sponsored counterdrug
operations. In addition to the suspension of U.S. overflight
rights, the Venezuelan government also issued a diplomatic
protest to the United States over the presence of a U.S.
Coast Guard vessel that had entered Venezuelan waters in
support of counterdrug operation. The United States
argued that this arrangement had been provided for under a
prior treaty arrangement. More generally, Chavez sought to
declare his independence from the United States by, among
other things, developing close relations with Cuba, and by
turning to Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) through overtures to Saddam Hussein, including a
visit to Iraq as well as a planned visit to Iran.36
In sum, Venezuelan authorities deplored what was
characterized as primarily a military approach to
Colombia’s internal problems and one that set the stage for
U.S. intervention in the region. Moreover, Venezuelan
officials went so far as to argue that U.S. military support to
Colombia would create a worrisome regional military
imbalance, but offered assurances that Venezuela would
not embark upon an arms buildup in response to Plan
Colombia.37
Ecuador’s Response.
Of all the frontline states, Ecuador faced what may be
the bleakest implications deriving from the Colombian
crisis. The 1990s had been a time of enormous domestic
financial and political turmoil that left the state teetering
on the brink of collapse. As pressure from Colombia
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mounted with the increasing penetration of Ecuadorian
territory by Colombians, Ecuador had little in the way of
resources that it could bring to bear upon its problem, given
its already severe internal crisis. Gustavo Noboa, the fifth
Ecuadorian president in 5 years, came to office in the
aftermath of a coup staged by a coalition force of disgruntled
junior army officers and indigenous rights activists
aggrieved by the nation’s economic crisis.38 The coup
attempt fizzled only after the very direct diplomatic
intervention by the leaders of neighboring states and most
particularly by the United States. All issued strong
warnings concerning the isolation Ecuador would face were
it to abandon democracy.
Ecuador’s difficulties stemmed from an array of both
international and domestic factors. Its most recent crisis
emerged as a result of pressures from political, financial,
investor, human rights, indigenous rights, and insurgent
forces.39 Desperate for solutions, the government sought to
achieve economic stability by “dollarizing” the economy.
Most observers agreed that this measure alone could do
little to secure stability for an economy in need of serious
structural reform. So severe were Ecuador’s political and
economic difficulties that fully 4 percent (500,000) of the
population had left the country in the 1999-2000 period. At
least one observer pointed to “globalization and the
economic transition that has hit the region hard”40 as the
chief reasons for Ecuador’s (and other similarly afflicted
states) acute difficulties. Ecuador had little capacity to
respond to rising pressure from the Colombian situation,
although it moved some forces to the Colombian border in
order to try to increase security.41
Sensing weakness, the FARC bluntly demanded that
Ecuador remain strictly neutral with regard to the
Colombian conflict, that it should refrain from supporting
Plan Colombia, and that it should resist the use of the
“fusarium oxysporum” fungus to eradicate coca crops.42
According to FARC representatives,
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There are certainly democratic sectors in Ecuador which are not
going to support Plan Colombia, and we believe there are
sectors within the Ecuadorian armed forces that are also not
going to open fire on their Colombian brothers. The Colombian
guerrillas do not consider the Ecuadorians or their army as their
enemies, neither do they consider the Venezuelans, Peruvians,
Brazilians, or Panamanians as their enemies. We have enough
land there. To come and fight here, to Ecuador; that would be
outrageous.43

Despite such “assurances,” Ecuador nonetheless felt
compelled to double its border forces to 4,000 troops44 as the
pressure in southern Colombia mounted. Ecuadorian
Foreign Minister Heinz Moeller announced the
implementation of a combined armed forces and police
border patrol program.45 According to Colombian sources,
Ecuador had become the principal source of supplies for the
FARC, including “food supplies, medicine, provisions,
weapons, ammunition, explosives, uniforms.”46 Ecuadorian
authorities struggled to respond with limited resources.
Farmers were being driven off of their land; the Ecuadorian
army had discovered four cocaine labs in Ecuadorian
territory; Colombian paramilitaries were reported to be
running extortion rings in Ecuador; and FARC and ELN
armed belligerents crossed regularly into Ecuadorian
territory with impunity.47 Reports indicate that hundreds of
Ecuadorian residents of the border area had fled in the face
of threats from both Colombian guerrillas and Colombian
paramilitaries.48 New evidence suggested FARC complicity
in the kidnapping of oil workers in Ecuador, an act that
originally was thought to have been the work of internal
criminal elements. 49 For Foreign Minister Moeller,
however, the problem, more ominously, was that of the
“ideological infiltration” of the border.
In the summer of 2000, the Ecuadorian National
Security Council (CSN), under the leadership of President
Noboa, announced that the war on drugs would be a priority
of the Ecuadorian government, and that the government
would devote special efforts to this objective through the
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creation of an “Executive Unit” that would focus upon social
and economic development in the region to be impacted by
Plan Colombia.50 At the same time, President Noboa
endorsed Plan Colombia51 and asked the United States for
$160 million in assistance to help create an economic buffer
zone on its border with Colombia. In particular, Ecuador
sought assistance to deal with Sucumbios province where
Colombian irregular forces congregated freely. Ecuador also
sought additional assistance to acquire helicopters, fast
boats, and reconnaissance equipment. The $160 million
would be part of Ecuador’s 4-year $300 million program to
stabilize the border region.52 According to Noboa, most of
the funds would be used to support social and economic
development initiatives in the region. Ecuador had been
allotted $20 million in the emergency supplemental
appropriation passed by the U.S. Congress in support of
Plan Colombia in 2000, but much more would be needed to
stabilize the situation. Ecuador requested further
assistance in financing five camps for refugees planned for
location on the Colombian border. The United Nations had
warned Ecuador to expect an influx of 25-30,000 refugees,
with the number potentially exceeding 40,000. Refugees
would be expected to stream into Ecuador from Colombia’s
Putumayo province once the southern offensive into
Colombia began, and indeed Ecuador reported that 8,000
refugees had arrived in the early days of the Colombian
operation. 53 Without enhanced financial support, the
Ecuadorian President suggested that Ecuador might have
to reconsider its agreement with the United States to allow
the use of its territory by U.S. antidrug aircraft.
The U.S.-Ecuadorian agreement in question established
a Forward Operating Location (FOL) at Manta Air Force
Base on Ecuador’s Pacific coast. Under the terms of a
50-year lease agreement and with a $62 million expenditure
in runway, hangar, dormitory, and other construction
upgrades, Manta stood as one of the leading U.S. military
initiatives in the region.54 Manta would have 400 U.S.
service personnel by October 2001, and would serve as a
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base for airborne warning and control system (AWACS)
reconnaissance aircraft and tanker refueling capability
deployed in support of counterdrug reconnaissance.55 From
the FARC point of view, the establishment of the U.S. FOL
at Manta constituted a “declaration of war,” and the FARC
warned that if U.S. aircraft were to fly out of Manta to
eradicate crops, the guerrillas would strike targets in
Ecuador.
In response to the perceived threat, Ecuador stationed
5,000 troops along the Colombian border in the provinces of
Napos and Sucumbios. According to Ecuadorian sources,
the FARC had previously identified Sucumbios as a
“strategic area,” and its intention was to hold this as a
secure sanctuary. 56 In sum, Ecuador faced intense
pressures from virtually all quarters and, because of its
weakness, sought to stengthen its relationship with the
United States, a measure that was likely to draw it more
directly into Colombia’s crisis. Some Ecuadorian
authorities worried that Manta would transform Ecuador
into the “new Panama,” stripping it of any sovereign
pretensions and exposing it to even greater external
threat.57
The Peruvian Response.
Unlike other states in the Andean Ridge, Peru had
conducted an intensive counterdrug and counterinsurgency
offensive for over a decade. With President Fujimori’s
ascent to power and subsequent initiatives, Peru developed
a set of capabilities that enabled it to establish sovereignty
over its territory and to attack fundamental economic
issues. While the process led to an increasingly
authoritarian and violent pattern of rule, replete with
human rights abuses and political repression, equilibrium
appeared to be maintained within the system. A consensus
had been forged between the political class, the business
class, and the military over the courses of action that had to
be taken to reestablish sovereignty over Peruvian territory.
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Peru aggressively pursued narcotraffickers and insurgents,
essentially winning a military victory over both groups.
One clear Peruvian advantage was a well-developed and
credible military capability and a willingness to use force. In
addition, Peru’s insurgent forces never developed the kinds
of links with narcotraffickers that proved to be so
devastating in Colombia. Further, Peru developed a
strategy for defeating the insurgents that focused upon
arming the rural population through the mechanism of
state-sponsored rondas campesinas or self-defense forces.
Compared to the Colombian self-defense forces that evolved
over time, the Peruvian rondas proved much more
successful, coming to serve as a legitimate auxiliary to the
armed forces of the state. Peru also adopted an aggressive
policy of air interdiction of drug traffickers, shooting down
scores of national aircraft involved in illicit activity.
The onset of the Colombian crisis proved to be more than
a match even for the tested Fujimori establishment. In part,
the political failures of the 2000 electoral period may have
been a manifestation of the exhaustion of Fujimori’s
political acumen, after years of apparent success. One could
not argue that a revolt by civil society caused the defeat of
the system, since Peruvian civil society was exceedingly
docile. Instead, the fundamentally corrupted character of
the regime, coupled with the inflammatory nature of the
FARC-arms trafficking allegations, triggered a collapse of
consensus among the ruling political and military elites,
causing the regime’s profound deterioration beginning in
the summer of 2000. Neither rigged elections, nor
Comandante Gonzalo, nor the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary
Movement (MRTA) seizure of the Japanese Embassy, nor
the contest of wills between the United States and Peru that
often characterized their relationship in the 1990s could
compare with the delegitimizing impact of the arms
trafficking charges, especially as seen within the wider
context of massive government corruption. Vladimiro
Montesinos’ involvement in arms trafficking to the
Colombian FARC forces proved to be a far more devastating
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event than the accumulated difficulties of 10 years of
internal war in Peru.58
In the meantime, evidence suggested that the
weakening of the Peruvian state led opportunistic elements
in the drug industry to begin once again to revive cocaine
production in Peru despite much progress on the issue.59
Although data show that coca production fell in 2000 for the
fifth consecutive year, dropping from 233,168 acres planted
to 84,474, there were numerous indications that Peru faced
new trafficking challenges ahead. The FARC’s 14th front
was reported to control labs in the Peruvian jungle between
the Napo and Putumayo rivers that ran directly into Brazil.
Observers suggested that local narcotrafficking interests
were preparing to build up production in Peru in
anticipation of the implementation of Plan Colombia,
essentially by paying higher prices to producers. Prices rose
steadily in Peru; poppies were now being grown and more
cocaine processing was evident, as was the development of
more labs. More Colombians and Mexicans were found to be
involved. Regrowth was observed in once abandoned areas,
and many new fields and new seed beds were also
observed.60
Peru’s former Minister of Foreign Relations, former U.N
Representative, and current chair of the Congress’s Foreign
Relations Commission, Francisco Tudela van BreugelDouglas, argued that, within the context of the region’s
struggle for development, a major potential threat is the
rejection of globalization in the name of defending
“reactionary utopias” or “bucolic utopias.” Tudela suggested
that bucolic reactionary politics may increasingly be linked
to drug trafficking in the Andean (and other regional) areas
behind what he terms the “smokescreen of ethnic politics.”
In other words, some of those defending such bucolic utopias
may be doing so disingenuously, using this political agenda
to mask their true illegal intentions. According to Tudela,
Plan Colombia created “huge awareness and big fears,”
principally the fear of injecting large amounts of money into
an economy with rampant illegal activity. Resources may
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fall into the wrong hands, producing far worse outcomes.
There were also fears of diasporas and of a domino effect.
For Peru, the spillover from the Colombian crisis was
expected to come through Ecuador, which is contiguous to
Peru. In addition, there was concern as to whether the
FARC would move into eastern Ecuador, thus triggering the
Colombianization of that country.61
The Bolivian Dilemma.
In the fall of 2000, Bolivia found itself confronted by
protests and labor strikes, leaving numerous dead and
wounded. While teachers were part of the striking
contingent, most of the rancor stemmed from the failure of
alternative development programs to adequately substitute
for coca production. The United States had committed $25
million for counterdrug efforts in the Chapare and Yungas
regions and allocated $85 million for alternative
development in these two areas.62 Coca growers’ unions,
however, as they had for years, fought to stop the
eradication program and to demilitarize the Chapare region
by staging roadblocks throughout the nation, leading
Bolivia to economic and political crisis. Bolivia’s capital city,
La Paz, faced food shortages and was all but blocked off from
the rest of the country, as 35,000 coca growers stood their
ground. 63 Yet the Banzer government remained committed
to the total eradication of illegal coca leaf by the end of the
2002 presidential term. Even so, peasants who depended
upon the crop for their livelihood in one of the region’s
poorest countries resisted: “The government says it will
take our land and send us to jail if we persist in growing
coca. We will have no alternative but to defend ourselves,
like in Colombia.” 64 The cocaleros were particularly
incensed over the news that the government would
construct, with U.S. financing, several small garrisons in
the coca growing areas to insure that the crop would not be
replanted.
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In the 1990s, Bolivia in fact achieved dramatic success in
reducing national acreage devoted to coca production. Coca
cultivation was reduced from 78,400 illegal acres to 4,000,
according to U.S. sources.65 According to Bolivian sources,
this signified a loss of some $700 million in illegal drug
income in just 2 years.66 Ironically, the economic deficit
created by success in the counterdrug effort helped to
plummet Bolivia into financial and social crisis. The
government responded by appealing to Washington for debt
relief and for improvement in trade relations in textiles, an
economic sector emphasized by Bolivia to provide labor
alternatives to the drug industry. Such appeals appeared to
hold little promise, particularly vis-à-vis textiles. As U.S.
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright noted during her
August 2000 visit to Bolivia: “We did discuss the issue of
textiles. I have to tell you, though, that this is a very
complicated problem as far as our trade relations with any
country is concerned.” Nevertheless, Albright noted that
Bolivia had received $450 million in debt forgiveness from
the period 1991 to 1999 and also received $115 million
annually in other assistance.67
Bolivia’s economic problems continued to worsen during
the years of the counterdrug regime and the Banzer
government. In the spring of 2000, the nation was gripped
by a paralyzing strike involving a water project that was to
privatize water investments, dramatically raising prices for
the population. Ambushes, protests, and small-scale
insurrections increasingly became the stuff of everyday
Bolivian life.68 While few observers believed that the
government faced a threat to its existence solely due to the
increasing ferment, it was unable to quell rising levels of
discontent. In an attempt to mollify those who decried the
government’s mistreatment of the indigenous population
and who urged the white population to leave the country,
the government agreed to appoint a minister for peasant
and indigenous affairs. An array of economic concessions
were also promised, suggesting that the cycle of protest and
concession would continue to spiral farther. In this context,
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the potential for a balloon effect in Bolivian narcotics
production was a real concern despite the government’s
pledge to end all illegal coca production by the end of 2002.
The Challenge to Panama.
Despite Panama’s desire to maintain a pose of neutrality
as its best shield against being drawn into the Colombian
crisis,69 Carlos Castano, the head of Colombia’s feared AUC
paramilitary “self defense” forces, accused Panama’s
National Guard of openly cooperating for financial gain
with Colombia’s insurgents and declared that he regarded
the Guard as a “military objective.”70 Despite these threats,
some such as Ricardo Arias Calderon argued that Panama
must insist upon maintaining its neutrality to safeguard
the Canal, and further suggested that a Contadora-like
effort be developed to forge a regional peace, with Brazil
potentially taking the lead in the effort. 71 Panama’s
ambassador to the United States, Guillermo Ford,
commented that “Plan Colombia is for Colombia. Panama
does not want to get involved in the internal problems of
Colombia. We’ve been shying away from that in every
way.”72
Threats to Panamanian citizens were escalating. The
Roman Catholic bishop of Darien, Romulo Emiliani, was
forced to flee the province because of threats from the
Colombian paramilitary forces. While Panama’s President
Mireya Moscoso promised more support to those attempting
to police the border, Panamanian territory was
transgressed and utilized with impunity by insurgents and
paramilitary forces. Colombian civilians fled in increasing
numbers to Panama as refugees from both insurgents and
paramilitaries. Although Panamanian police twice engaged
with FARC insurgents in Panama’s Darien province during
2000, these Panamanian forces had little or no capacity to
respond and were no match for the well-equipped and
comparatively well-trained forces of the FARC and the
AUC.
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Panama has been used continuously as a major venue for
arms shipments, a practice that was likely to increase as the
FARC boosts its forces to an expected 30-35,000 combatants
in response to Plan Colombia. By the same token, the AUC
was expected to increase its forces in response to the
expected FARC increases. To the extent that arms
shipments traversed Central America and implicated
Central America, the expansion of the network of corruption
and criminality could only be expected to expand further.73
Indeed, the problem of arms-for-cocaine trafficking reached
deeply into Mexico, America’s own neighbor, where FARC
cooperation with Mexico’s Tijuana Cartel was under attack
by Mexico’s new Fox administration.
Since the implementation of the Panama Canal
Treaties, discussions have taken place concerning the
possibility of establishing a new arrangement for a U.S.
presence in Panama. At the time of final implementation,
negotiations had taken place to establish a Multinational
Drug Center, but final agreement was never reached. The
prospect of a return of U.S. forces to Panama was a difficult
matter for Panamanians, but the Panamanian government
was able to forge an agreement with the United States for
the training of 1,000 Panamanian police assigned to border
patrol.
Panama’s substantial involvement in money laundering
activities was a source of continuing concern. In July 2000,
the U.S. Department of Treasury included Panama on a
blacklist of states that were not cooperating with efforts to
control money laundering activities. 74 Panama was
included on the U.S. Financial Action Task Force list of
Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories. Panama,
however, pressured the United States to be removed from
the list as acknowledgement of its cooperation in receiving
Peru’s Vladimiro Montesinos into the country on a
temporary asylum basis at the request of the United States
and the OAS. Panama did so because it had been alleged
that a military coup was in the offing in Peru as a result of
the Montesinos affair.
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President Moscoso’s position was that Plan Colombia
was a matter between Colombia and the United States, and
declared her intention to avoid having Panama become
involved in the program. At the same time, Panama was
singularly ill-equipped to grapple with the illegal and
criminal operations that were at the root of the Colombian
crisis. Some would argue that Panama faced the choice of
becoming entirely overwhelmed by Colombian forces or
seeking to establish, once again, what could only amount to
a protectorate relationship with the United States.
Ultimately, concern for the security of the Panama Canal
may further increase pressures on Panama to take more
formal steps in that direction. The recent seizure of aircraft
by FARC forces from a former U.S. base may indicate a
rising threat in Panama.
The Brazilian Calculus.
At the Fourth Defense Ministerial of the Americas
convened in the city of Manaus, Brazil, Brazilian president
Fernando Henrique Cardoso issued a call for “shared
cooperation” to deal with the drug problem. This would form
part of a new concept of security for the region. “We share a
broad concept of regional security which depends on
democracy and sustainable development, values that have
taken root from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego.”75 One of the
president’s greatest concerns was the need to shield the
Amazon region from the further spread of narcotrafficking.
Toward that end, some years ago the Brazilian government
launched its plan for the Surveillance of the Amazon System
(SIVAM/SIPAM). The $1.7 billion system of radars and
sensors, to be supported by reconnaissance and fighter
aircraft, was to provide the “eyes” and the “reach” for the
Brazilian government into the Amazon to establish
sovereignty in its vast, unwatched, and uncontrolled areas.
The system, according to Cardoso, would enable the
government to “reinforce our presence with technology, not
just with men.” 76 Yet Cardoso stated at the Defense
Ministerial meetings held in Manaus that “the problem is a
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domestic problem,” and that “we are not interested at all in
any kind of Brazilian intervention in Colombia.”77
There was no doubt about Brazil’s deep concern over its
border areas and its Amazon territories. Brazil’s
commitment to its new enormously expensive surveillance
system came in a period of dramatically reduced overall
defense spending for the Brazilian state. Further, it
dovetailed with the wholesale redesign of Brazilian defense
policy that shifted the focus of the nation’s defenses from
Brazil’s southern border with Argentina to its northern and
western borders in the Amazon region. In addition to
preparations for the deployment of SIVAM/SIPAM, Brazil
also deployed additional police along its 1,000 mile border
with Colombia. More dramatically, in reaction to pressure
on its border, Brazil stationed a total of 23,000 troops along
the border in 63 locations, up from a force of 6,000 in 1991.
These forces were to remain stationed in these positions
throughout the duration of Plan Colombia.78
Put most directly, however, Brazilian authorities did not
support Plan Colombia. While they supported a negotiated
settlement, they did not support what was viewed as a
military approach to the problem. They feared U.S.
intervention in the region, worried about sovereignty
issues, and wished to preserve their own leadership options
as the major regional power. Brazilian officials chose to
characterize the insurgent crisis as an exclusively internal
political matter (much as did the United States) that would
have to be resolved politically within Colombia. As with
other states in the region, the government feared that
heightened military activity in Colombia would simply push
the problem across Brazil’s borders. Moreover, Brazilian
authorities worried about the environmental effects of crop
fumigation in Colombia and the potential for winds from
Colombia to carry chemicals over the Amazon.
According to General Alberto Cardoso, President
Cardoso’s chief security advisor, “For Brazil, Colombia is
causing the biggest worry. Our attention is dedicated to the
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effects it could have on Brazil, like the flight of guerrillas
and the transfer of [drug] laboratories and plantations.”79
Although President Cardoso indicated that President
Pastrana “deserves our firm support,”80 Foreign Minister
Lampreia clearly delineated Brazil’s intent during an
August 2000 visit to Brasilia by U.S. Secretary of State
Albright who was seeking Brazil’s support for Plan
Colombia. The Foreign Minister outlined Brazilian policy
with regard to possible cooperation with the United States
and Colombia as follows:
Now, your question about possible common action programs:
No, I would say that we do not have the same degree of
commitment with the drug trafficking program of President
Pastrana or his peace plan. But that being said, we’ve told
President Pastrana that we will review with interest, and of
course, within our possibilities, we will try to answer
positively to any request from Colombia to try to help their
development and their peace process, but we have no intention
of participating in any common or consorted international
action in the country.81

According to one newspaper report, Minister Lampreia
“stressed the autonomy of Brazil, Latin America’s largest
country, and said Brazil would not participate in the major
Washington campaign to help battle Colombian drug
traffickers.”82 In a similar vein, Minister Lampreia also
outlined Brazil’s disagreement with regional calls for
sanctions on Peru for its electoral irregularities of the spring
and summer 2000.
Warning of the likely flight of drug operatives into Brazil
once Colombia’s southern offensive began in December
2000, representatives of the USSOUTHCOM reportedly
sought to encourage collaboration with Brazil and proposed
police, military, and intelligence cooperation, but found a
less than enthusiastic response.83 On the other hand, while
Brazil did not support what it viewed as the military
approach taken by the United States and Colombia, it
nonetheless expressed willingness to share intelligence
gathered from the SIVAM system with Colombia. Although
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the Brazilian legislature in 1998 passed an aggressive
shoot-down policy designed to control aircraft entering
Brazilian airspace illegally,84 the policy had yet to be
implemented to the consternation of some military and law
enforcement authorities. Nevertheless, Brazil reportedly
intended to spend $3.5 billion for fighter aircraft and
transport aircraft to support its new surveillance system,
and planned to “refurbish 100 jets” in support of the
program.85 Brazil also reportedly entered a partnership
with the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company
(EADS) to support Amazon surveillance operations and
held discussions for purchase of heavy troop transport
helicopters with Russia’s Rosoboronexport.86 In sum, Brazil
moved aggressively to respond at the national level to the
perceived regional threat despite its marked reluctance to
participate in region-wide, collective security solutions to
the crisis.
FARC insurgents routinely used Brazilian territory as
sanctuary and to obtain food, medicine, and supplies. Brazil
also served as an important transshipment venue for
narcotics, and had become a substantial source of precursor
chemicals. Brazilian territory had already been the site (on
rare occasion) of military engagement involving Colombian
forces. Yet a precedent was set when Colombian troops fled
to Brazilian territory following the FARC assault in Mitu in
1998. Although Colombian forces counterattacked and
partially retook the city by staging from Brazil, Brazilian
authorities preferred to declare this use of Brazilian
national territory as primarily involving humanitarian
considerations for the beleaguered Colombian troops in
order to avoid a confrontation with Colombia over the
issue.87
Brazil’s overall policy conformed to its longstanding
principles of independence and reluctance to cooperate in
formal military terms with projects involving the United
States. More than any other state touched by the spreading
contagion, Brazil had the resources to marshal a defense of
its territory and sovereignty largely on its own terms, yet
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this would be no guarantee of success because of the
elusiveness and mobility of opposing forces and the
insidiously corrupting influences upon what were now
out-manned law enforcement and military forces.
At present, despite the fact that there are 23,000 troops
stationed in the Amazon area, they are poorly prepared to
tackle the agile forces that constitute the potential
adversary. Further, Brazil currently only has a handful of
police outposts available to contest illegal entry and illegal
activities. While Brazil recognized that the border must be
fortified, it did not adopt a “Maginot line”approach. It feared
more the onslaught of massive drug use, drug
manufacturing, and arms trafficking, recognizing that
domestic Brazilian drug consumption levels had lately
skyrocketed. Brazil has already suffered spillover effects for
2 decades in its border region with Colombia: cocaine paste
had routinely been routed in from Peru, and the refined
drug was imported from Colombia for export or for domestic
consumption. Brazil also feared the prospects of U.S. armed
forces on its border, owing to longstanding suspicions about
U.S. intentions in the Amazon region. In recognition of
these growing fears, Brazil recently announced a 3-year $10
million program dubbed Operation COBRA which would
increase police presence at border crossings, on waterways,
and in air space. The program involved seven Brazilian
federal agencies as well as the army. 88
A NEW AGENDA
Although U.S. authorities readily admitted that
attention would have to be paid to the regional implications
of both the crisis in Colombia and Plan Colombia, the
approach taken tended to be bilateral and reactive rather
than proactive on a multilateral basis. As Ecuador’s Foreign
Minister admitted, Colombia had provided no information
about its plan to neighboring states. Indeed, few within
Colombia had much of a sense of the plan’s objectives. Yet,
the regional nature of the problem was clearly noted by
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senior U.S. officials. Former Under Secretary of State
Thomas R. Pickering observed that, with respect to requests
for aid to the region, “I think this is evolving now into not
just a pure Colombia issue, but an Andean regional issue,
something it has always been. I think in future years there
will be a broader regional aspect to this as we plan and
propose to the Congress new budgets for this kind of
activity.”89
Though the Clinton administration’s reaction to the
growing crisis in the Andes had focused narrowly upon
Colombia, the hemispheric summit process had also tended
to overlook the explicit regional threat. Indeed, at the 1998
Santiago summit, virtually no mention was made of the
threat to Colombia and adjacent states, although the issue
of narcotrafficking was certainly addressed.90 The situation
would change in important ways with the advent of the 2001
Quebec Summit.
Prior to the Summit, regional leaders traveled to
Washington in unprecedented numbers (for such an early
point in a new U.S. administration) to consult about the
urgency of the regional crisis and to appeal for a new
approach. While the Bush administration sought to move
cautiously, it was clear that even the more limited
counterdrug option that had previously characterized U.S.
policy in the region was facing more and more complex
challenges. The State Department’s annual report on
narcotics stated:
With the drug trade now an organic part of the Colombian civil
conflict, the question facing the antidrug coalition will be how to
reduce the supply of illegal drugs without exacerbating local
conflicts that threaten regional stability.91

Several factors appear to have converged to encourage a
series of new initiatives from regional leaders concerning
the crisis. To begin with, the election of Vicente Fox in
Mexico appeared to have facilitated Colombia’s apparent
“rapprochement” with President Chavez of Venezuela,
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leading to the revival of the long moribund “Group of Three”
(Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico). The subsequent
improved spirit of amicability, following “intense diplomatic
efforts to mend relations,” led to new initiatives in the
Colombian-Venezuelan relationship, including the
announcement of joint border operations with the
Colombian and Venezuelan armed forces.92
This measure of progress in turn facilitated the
convening of the meeting of the Andean leaders in
Cartegena, Colombia, on April 19, 2001, immediately prior
to the Quebec Summit. This meeting produced several
dramatic developments. First, in a remarkable turnabout,
President Chavez announced that he no longer had any
reservations concerning Plan Colombia. While denying that
his policy had changed, he declared, “What we had warned
about, not against Plan Colombia, but against its military
component, that chapter has been closed. Doubts that
existed in any instance regarding Plan Colombia have now
been clarified.”93 Chavez elsewhere explained that the
briefings he had received revealed a plan for socio-economic
development that addressed inequality and that deserved
support.
With Chavez no longer an obstacle to a regional
approach, the Andean leaders next developed what they
termed a “Regional Counternarcotics Strategy.” 94 The
strategy called for the formation of a bloc for “political
cooperation to deal with the scourge of illicit drugs and to
create alternatives for development that would promote
legal employment.”95 As a cornerstone of the approach, the
Andean leaders called for renewal of the U.S. Andean Trade
Preferences Act set to expire in December 2001 to stimulate
economic growth and employment in the region. The
proposal called for the inclusion of Venezuela in the group of
beneficiary nations. The leaders asked that the Act be
amended to cover all products manufactured in the region,
specifically emphasizing the inclusion of textiles.96 It also
provided for a full exemption from tariffs and quotas for
Andean production. The new strategy, among other things,
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called for cooperating states to create joint policies and to
reach border agreements in order to combat drug cartels.97
At the Quebec Summit, the Andean leaders presented a
letter to President Bush, again urging renewal of a more
generous Andean Trade Preferences Act, declaring “We
need real help.” Together, the leaders of Colombia, Peru,
Bolivia, and Ecuador (acting on their own and Venezuela’s
behalf) urged swift action to improve the region’s economic
prospects. While a spirit of cooperation prevailed despite
President Chavez’s declaration that Venezuela might not be
able to join the Free Trade of the Americas Act (FTAA)
unless approved by popular referendum, the prospect for
Andean regional cooperation in problem-solving appeared
to have brightened considerably.
For its part, the Bush administration unveiled its
proposal for Fiscal Year 2002 support for the region. Its
Andean Regional Initiative proposed to triple the amount of
support for Colombia’s neighboring states and substantially
increased the proportion of funds devoted to economic
development as compared to interdiction. While appearing
to be responsive to calls for a broader approach to the
region’s problem, the Andean Regional Initiative
nonetheless established performance goals of a 30 percent
reduction in Colombian coca production between January
2000 and December 2002, and called for the elimination of
all illegal coca production in Bolivia by the end of calendar
year 2002.98
While the performance goals identified by the initiative
appear to be predictably one-dimensional, the Summit also
produced a commitment to support investment in the region
preparatory to the FTAA. The World Bank and the IADB
reportedly pledged $20 billion to “strengthen democratic
foundations” in the region. 99 Performance criteria
associated with these funds were likely to target
foundational issues of national development as stipulated
by the program’s purposes.
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The multifaceted crises of the Andean Ridge states and
spillover from the acute Colombian crisis threatened
stability, democracy, and economic prospects in the region.
The complexity and the reverberatory international
character of these threats outstripped the capability of the
majority of states in the region to resist these pressures.
Within the context of expanding globalization, one might
have expected that the first inclination on the part of the
besieged states would have been a collaborative approach to
meeting these challenges. Yet, as globalization increasingly
undermined state sovereignty, leaders in turn found it
correspondingly more difficult to embrace approaches that
further reduced national sovereignty, even for plausible
purposes. This is particularly the case in the Latin
American environment where the political culture of foreign
policy tradition has so emphatically elevated to primacy the
principles of non-intervention, national self-determination,
and sovereignty.
The Andean crisis had reached such proportions in the
minds of regional leaders, however, that they began to
consider the benefits of collective action. While these
leadershad yet to agree upon a regional security approach to
the crisis, their efforts to coordinate economic policy,
develop an avenue to cooperative border management,
arrive at coordinated counterdrug policies, and, perhaps
most importantly, reach a unified position on the United
States, were positive steps toward fashioning a regional
stance. At the same time, optimism had to be tempered by
the record of prior efforts toward Andean regional
cooperation that have proved disappointing.
Certainly U.S. reaction to these initiatives would be of
the utmost importance in either encouraging or
discouraging such innovation. Also important would be
Brazil’s decision either to embrace a new approach on the
issue, taking a cue from the Andean leaders, or to remain
largely aloof from regional security cooperation. By
contrast, Mexico’s new leaders appeared to be creating a
model for the region for a new era of regional security
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cooperation. For their part, as the Andean states sought to
recover stability and defeat their adversaries, they were
being forced to grapple with complexities in the
international environment that would require changes in
their approach to interstate behavior, changes that they
were now apparently more willing to accept.
CONCLUSION
For the moment, despite speculation concerning its
future attitude to the Colombian crisis, the Bush
administration remains committed to supporting Plan
Colombia. 100 Early reports from the administration
suggested a degree of uncertainty regarding the overall
policy approach, the heightened emphasis upon Western
Hemisphere affairs notwithstanding. Indications have been
that the entire policy will be undergoing extensive review.
In the interim, the administration has broadened its
focus on the issue to include more emphasis upon
development programs along with more emphasis upon
support for Colombia’s neighboring states.101 U.S. Secretary
of State Colin Powell has suggested that the Andean
Regional Initiative represents a more comprehensive
perspective. Powell stated that the
regional initiative that I will be defending before the Congress . . .
allows us in future years not just to focus on narco-trafficking in
Colombia but to see the problem as a regional problem and to
invest in human rights activities, to invest in infrastructure
development, to invest in economic opportunities that will
encourage people to move away from narco-trafficking , and to
see this problem as a regional problem and not just a simple
problem of narco-traffickers in Colombia alone. 102

The Andean Regional Initiative has been described as
providing “comprehensive and coordinated assistance to
seven different countries” impacted by the Colombian crisis,
and was developed in consultation with the seven recipient
states and with European and “other potential donors.” 103
This new level of coordination represents a positive
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beginning for what needs to be a systematic multistate
analysis of the problem. U.S. authorities have argued that
this kind of coordination was not possible in the moment of
crisis to which the $1.3 billion supplemental Plan Colombia
appropriation responded.104
According to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Western Hemisphere Affairs William R. Brownfield, the
shift resulted from criticism of the plan and of the United
States package of support for the plan which was labeled as
being too focused on “security and law enforcement” and
“overly focused on Colombia.”105 The complaints of interest
groups, the United States Congress, the news media, and
European donor countries; consultations in Bogota and
Madrid; and the influence of Mexico and Brazil pushed the
administration to redirect its energies and resources to the
three ds—democracy, development, and drugs. Elsewhere,
other administration officials had argued that the initial
package of U.S. support for Plan Colombia emphasizing
security and hardware acquisition had laid the necessary
groundwork that would permit more emphasis later upon
programs geared to social stabilization.
While the shift in emphasis had much to commend it, the
conclusion implicit in the change was that Colombia’s
security situation had improved to the point that
substantial new sums could be profitably introduced into
Colombian social programs designed to defend democracy
and to promote development, including improvement of
justice systems, alternative crop development, and so forth.
Yet no evidence to that effect was presented or even hinted
at. Indeed, Colombian government plans called for the
addition of 10,000 more soldiers per year to the army “until
the army and police are large enough to provide security for
their entire country.”106Moreover, the administration had
not seemed to move closer to confronting a central dilemma:
if it were to continue to identify drugs as its chief concern,
then how would it respond to the Colombian Defense
Minister Ramirez Acuna’s assertion that “fighting the
drugs has gone from being a criminal problem to a military
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one.”107 The “military” aspect of the problem was driven by
the strengthening alliances between insurgents,
paramilitary forces, and narcotraffickers. It would be less
and less possible to engage in the kind of semantic
sleight-of-hand that characterized U.S. policy in the 1990s,
driven by U.S. resistance to intervening in a civil war. For
his part, General Pace observed in testimony to the House
Armed Services Committee:
If you asked me to make a distinction between narcotraffickers
and the insurgents, I can draw that line for you. But it is a very,
very clouded line. And in fact in my mind it is a distinction that
probably has lost its value. The bottom line from my perspective
is that if you are trafficking in drugs, regardless of what else you
do, if you are trafficking in drugs you are a narcotrafficker. And
the symbiotic relationship between the insurgents and the
narcotraffickers has so confused that distinction that it’s very
difficult to do.108

More worrisome still was that the apparent shift in
emphasis in assistance to Colombia was based not upon a
strategic analysis of the conflict, but rather upon the
administration’s response to the political predilections of
interested parties largely outside of Colombia. That is to
say, changes in policy emphasis appeared to be, now more
than ever, a function of political constraints rather than
strategic analysis. This, in turn, calls into question the
chances for the policy’s success. Given the weight of these
constraints, the challenge for the administration will be to
find a way to observe the precepts of collective security while
maintaining a coherent strategic policy.
If there is to be any maturation of U.S. policy toward the
Andean region, it will be incumbent upon the U.S.
administration to conduct a sound strategic analysis of the
region’s destabilization, lead in the articulation of strategic
objectives, and design a defensible and feasible policy that
can gain the support of critical congressional, interest
group, and news media elements in the United States,
above and beyond the concurrence of the Andean and other
impacted states. Given the importance attached by the
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Bush administration to achieving a free trade agreement by
2005 and given the difficulties faced in simply renewing the
Andean Trade Preferences Act to the satisfaction of all
parties, the United States will have to devote considerable
political resources to moving policy beyond the piecemeal
improvisation that now substitutes for strategy.
The engagement responsibilities of the U.S. military in
the Andean area have been extensive. The United States
Security Strategy for the Americas (2000) outlines U.S.
military taskings in the Andean Ridge nations as focusing
upon defense partnerships.109 The scope of support to
Andean states in counterdrug interdiction has grown
steadily since the late 1980s. At the operational level, the
problem for USSOUTHCOM has remained that of resource
scarcity, particularly in the areas of intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and “in national,
theater and tactical collection and processing for signals
intelligence (SIGINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), and
imagery intelligence (IMINT).110
In addition, SOUTHCOM Commander-in-Chief General
Peter Pace has identified the need for improved budgetary
support for foreign military sales and financing. In
testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, Pace
noted that Congress had allocated $220 million in 1991 for
this activity, but in 2000 the budget stood at only $3.5
million, “a drastic reduction in the amount of money that we
spend in assisting our friends in the region to build their
own capabilities.”111
Still another problem area may be the issue of the use of
contractors to support Department of Defense (DoD) and
other U.S. Government agencies’ commitments in the
region. Increasingly, the reliance upon contractors has been
called into question by congressional critics and by the
Colombian government itself, as witnessed by the
termination of Military Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI)
responsibilities for DoD-sponsored assistance to the
Colombian Ministry of Defense. How U.S. Government
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agencies, and DoD in particular, will replace these assets
remains to be determined and may gravely complicate
matters.112
A major challenge facing the U.S. military in the near
term will involve maintaining the support of regional
partners in cooperative programs, given Washington’s
perceived strategic uncertainty. Enhancing the confidence
of partners in Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela will be of the
utmost priority. As a matter of official policy, however, the
current U.S. military tasking in the Andean Ridge area
remains clear: counterdrug support. Without an overall
strategic reconsideration of the region’s problem and of the
threat to hemispheric democracies, the U.S. military will
continue to focus upon training and operational support for
regional states’ counterdrug operations and assisting
partner nations with the enhancement of their own
counterdrug detection and interdiction capabilities.
Ultimately, regardless of whether the overall policy guiding
U.S. military tasking shifts marginally or dramatically, the
more that U.S. military leadership can do to promote
region-wide security cooperation and to build cooperative
relationships within the circle of impacted states, thus
overcoming traditions of bilateralism, the greater the
prospect for long-term success in reducing the level of
regional instability.
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